ผู้ใช้:Thucydides49/กระบะทราย
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 "Search - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy". www.rep.routledge.com.
- ↑ Penelope Rush, "Logical Realism", in: Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 13–31.
- ↑ Gestalt Theory: Official Journal of the Society for Gestalt Theory and Its Applications (GTA), 22, Steinkopff, 2000, p. 94: "Attention has varied between Continental Phenomenology (late Husserl, Merleau-Ponty) and Austrian Realism (Brentano, Meinong, Benussi, early Husserl)".
- ↑ Mark Textor, The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy, Routledge, 2006, pp. 170–1:
"[Husserl argues in the Logical Investigations that the rightness of a judgement or proposition] shows itself in our experience of self-evidence (Evidenz), which term Husserl takes from Brentano, but makes criterial not of truth per se but of our most secure awareness that things are as we take them to be, when the object of judgement, the state of affairs, is given most fully or adequately. ... In his struggle to overcome relativism, especially psychologism, Husserl stressed the objectivity of truth and its independence of the nature of those who judge it ... A proposition is true not because of some fact about a thinker but because of an objectively existing abstract proposition's relation to something that is not a proposition, namely a state of affairs." - ↑ Moran, D. and Cohen, J., 2012, The Husserl Dictionary. London, Continuum Press: p. 151 ("Hyletic data (hyletischen Daten)"): "In Ideas I § 85, Husserl uses the term 'hyletic data' to refer to the sensuous constituents of our intentional experiences".
- ↑ "Pre-reflective self-consciousness" is Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi's term for Husserl's idea that consciousness always involves a self-appearance or self-manifestation (เยอรมัน: Für-sich-selbst-erscheinens; E. Husserl (1959), Erste Philosophie II 1923–24, Husserliana VIII, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 189, 412) and his idea that the fact that "an appropriate train of sensations or images is experienced, and is in this sense conscious, does not and cannot mean that this is the object of an act of consciousness, in the sense that a perception, a presentation or a judgment is directed upon it" (E. Husserl (1984), Logische Untersuchungen II, Husserliana XIX/1–2, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 165; English translation: Logical Investigations I, translated by J. N. Findlay, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 273). See "Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ↑ Smith, B. & Smith, D. W., eds. (1995), The Cambridge companion to Husserl, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 301–2, ISBN 0-521-43616-8
{{citation}}:|author=มีชื่อเรียกทั่วไป (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (ลิงก์). - ↑ Rollinger 1999, p. 126.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Sebastian Luft (ed.), The Neo-Kantian Reader, Routledge 2015, pp. 461–3.